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Abstract—In this paper we provide secrecy metrics applicable
to physical-layer coding techniques with finite blocklengths over
Gaussian and fading wiretap channel models. Our metrics go
beyond some of the known practical secrecy measures, such as
bit error rate and security gap, so as to make lower bound
probabilistic guarantees on error rates over short blocklengths
both preceding and following a secrecy decoder. Our techniques
are especially useful in cases where application of traditional
information-theoretic security measures is either impractical or
simply not yet understood. The metrics can aid both practical
system analysis, and practical system design for physical-layer
security codes. Furthermore, these new measures fill a void in
the current landscape of practical security measures for physical-
layer security coding, and may assist in the wide-scale adoption of
physical-layer techniques for security in real-world systems. We
also show how the new metrics provide techniques for reducing
realistic channel models to simpler discrete memoryless wiretap
channel equivalents over which existing secrecy code designs may
achieve information-theoretic security.
EDICS Category: COM-OTHS, INF-SECC
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer security has attracted much attention of late
as a means to provide a keyless layer of security using error-
control coding and other physical-layer techniques such as
intentional jamming [1], [2]. While traditional information-
theoretic secrecy measures have been the preferred vehicles for
proving the worth of physical-layer security coding schemes,
some channel models remain elusive to this type of analy-
sis [3]. In this paper, we provide two new security metrics that
apply when blocklengths are finite (and especially when they
are short), and when channel models are more representative
of real-world environments.
Coding techniques exist that can achieve strong secrecy,
and even semantic secrecy over the binary erasure wiretap
channel [4], but in the face of fading, jamming, and otherwise
Gaussian noise, there remains a dearth of useful secrecy met-
rics beyond simple bit-error rates (BER). The one exception is
the security gap [5], which provides a measure on the required
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signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) advantage over an eavesdropper to
operate at acceptable error rates for friendly parties with an
acceptable amount of security over illegitimate receivers. Our
metrics go beyond security gap, so as to identify operable
regions of SNR for which bit-error rates, even over a short
number of bits, are guaranteed to be near 0.5. The basic
premise of our techniques is to evaluate the distribution of
error rates over a small number of bits, such as might be
transmitted over a single packet, or within a single coded
word, and to make guarantees not only on the mean of the
distribution, but rather on, e.g., the 10th percentile or even
the 1st percentile of the distribution. A proper tool that allows
us to make these claims is the simple cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the error rate over short blocklengths.
As one considers percentiles closer to zero, the guarantees
of our secrecy metrics are such that every small block of
transmitted data either fails to be decoded (for the first metric),
or achieves decoder output bit-error rates greater than 0.5− δ
(for the second metric). These metrics fill a void in the current
landscape of security measures for secrecy codes, and find
immediate application in real-world environments.
Consider the wiretap setup as depicted in Fig. 1, where
the receiver chains for both a legitimate receiver Bob and an
eavesdropper Eve are pictured. We consider here a possibly
concatenated coding system, where the outer code is for
security (and may consist of any number of coding operations
as indicated), and the inner code is for reliability. Based on
early work over the wiretap channel [6], [7], we know that
there exists a supremum of achievable rates such that both
security and reliability can be attained. This rate is called the
secrecy capacity Cs. Unfortunately, the grand majority of all
currently known explicit secrecy codes do not provide both
reliability and security, but rather offer security as long as
the legitimate receiver’s channel is noiseless. Explicit code
constructions that are exceptions to this rule require that the
eavesdropper’s channel is degraded from the main legitimate
receiver’s channel, and only work for discrete memoryless
channels [1]. One possible framework for extending these
results is to employ a concatenated coding scheme as we
illustrate in Fig. 1. It should be noted that the inner code in
this figure is marked as optional, and if it is removed, then
the model reduces to the traditional wiretap channel model [6].
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Thus, although we are considering our new metrics in cases
where concatenated codes are used, they remain applicable
to the general wiretap case. We note the transmitter Alice
encodes a message through all stages of the encoder to produce
a length-n codeword Xn, which is transmitted over the wiretap
channel. Bob and Eve observe their respective signals Y n
and Zn, and both attempt to decode the message, perhaps
producing respective message estimates Mˆ and M˜ .
A. An Example
As a simple example, consider the case where the outer code
is just a scrambler, implemented by multiplying the binary
length-k message M by a k×k binary matrix that is invertible
in GF (2) at the encoder and its inverse at the decoder. Let’s
assume that the inner code is a t-error correcting code, such
as a BCH code. If the channel is a Gaussian or a fading
channel, then an information-theoretic security analysis may
prove difficult. The alternative is to simulate the concatenated
coding scheme at the decoder so as to obtain some guarantee
on BER. When this is done, simulations are typically averaged
over thousands of runs to obtain an average BER, and although
the analysis is simulation driven, the results still only hold
asymptotically as blocklengths become very large, just as in
an information-theoretic analysis (if it’s even possible).
We wish to provide probabilistic guarantees of decoder
failure and guarantees of low statistical dependence between
the message M and an eavesdropper’s decoder output message
M˜ . Despite the fact that BER has several shortcomings as
a security metric, it can still be used effectively to estimate
decoder outputs when the eavesdropper’s attack strategy is
known. Our metrics strengthen this approach by considering
the entire distribution of possible error rates. In Fig. 2 we show
the BER both before and after the scrambler in a receiver,
and as expected the descrambling operation propagates errors
into the message estimate. However, if we’d like to guarantee
error rates close to 0.5 in all k-bit message estimates at the
eavesdropper, it is necessary to consider the entire distribution
of error rates over a blocklength of data. We see curves for
Pr(Pˆb > 0.5−δ) in the figure, where Pˆb can be used to model
the proportion of bits in error over one block of k bits either at
the input or at the output of the outer decoder, and is a point
estimator of the true bit error rate Pb. To be more specific, let
B be a random variable that represents the number of bits in
error over k bits either at the input or the output of the outer
decoder. Then
Pˆb =
B
k
, (1)
and is coincidentally the maximum likelihood estimator for the
bit error rate Pb given k independent observations [8]. While
the errors in k received bits comprising a single transmitted
codeword are likely not independent at the output of a decoder,
we will address this concern later in Section V. Notice in Fig. 2
that if we want Pr(Pˆb > 0.5−δ) after the decoder to get close
to one, then we need to allow δ > 0.15 for this scheme, and
somehow ensure that Eve’s Eb/N0 is no better than 3 dB.
Also note that we use this simple example to showcase the
general applicability of the new metrics, as comparing error
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Fig. 2. New security metrics for a simple system where the outer code is a
scrambler and the inner code is a BCH(127, 64) code. BER curves are given
in blue with no markers, and Pr(Pˆb > 0.5−δ) curves are given with markers
as indicated to identify the values of δ. Solid lines indicate the location is
before the outer coder, while dashed lines indicate the location is after the
outer coder.
rates before and after the outer decoder gives one method
for quantifying the contribution of the descrambler to the
data received by the eavesdropper, but we are not proposing
scrambling with BCH codes as a security solution.
B. Outline
Throughout this paper, we will let SNR designate the signal-
to-noise ratio as measured by the channel, meaning the energy
per transmitted bit over the noise power spectral density
N0. Eb/N0 will be the energy per information bit divided
by N0. The two are related by the overall rate R of the
concatenated coding scheme so that SNR = REb/N0 for
BPSK transmission.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we
survey the landscape of secrecy metrics for physical-layer
security coding schemes in Section II. We then point out some
shortcomings and motivate the need for additional practical
metrics in Section III. Since the main contribution of this paper
is the introduction of new secrecy metrics, these two sections
are absolutely crucial. In Section III we also highlight the
cases for which our metrics are superior to both information-
theoretic and BER-based existing metrics, and point out their
limitations. Sections IV and V provide our new metrics BE-
CDFbc and BER-CDFac, respectively, with definitions and
clarifying examples. Finally, we show a use case of these
metrics in a more complicated concatenated coding scheme in
Section VI, and indicate how the scheme may be used directly
for secrecy, or used to provide a discrete memoryless wiretap
channel equivalent over which additional secrecy codes may be
used to achieve information-theoretic security. We offer some
comments by way of conclusion in Section VII.
II. SECRECY METRICS
The secrecy metric space has progressively become more
dense, particularly over the last few decades. The initial
secrecy coding metric posed by Shannon in the late 1940’s
was that of perfect secrecy [9]. A code is said to achieve
perfect secrecy if
I(M ;Xn) = 0, (2)
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Fig. 1. Wiretap channel model assuming a concatenated coding scheme, where the outer code is for secrecy and the inner code is for reliability. Note that the
inner code is marked as optional, and if it is removed, then this model reduces to the traditional wiretap channel model. The new metrics presented in this
work are BE-CDFbc (where bc indicates before code), and BER-CDFac (where ac indicates after code).
or, alternatively, if the equivocation H(M |Xn) is equal to the
entropy of the message H(M). Perfect secrecy indicates that
the coded message tells you nothing about the message itself.
Shannon introduced the notion through the coding scheme of
the one-time pad, and promptly proved that it was impossible
to achieve perfect secrecy in a scheme where the entropy of a
secret key is not at least as much as the entropy of the message
itself, making the notion completely impractical.
In the mid-seventies, Wyner [6] introduced an additional
metric for secrecy that is known today as weak secrecy. A
scheme is said to achieve weak secrecy if
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(M ;Zn) = 0. (3)
This metric introduced the idea of coding for secrecy in earnest
because the results indicated that it was actually possible to
achieve weak secrecy in a practical system. After all, this
criterion does not require that the coded message Xn leaks
no information about M , but rather that the eavesdropper’s
observation Zn must leak a sufficiently small amount of
information about M such that the 1/n factor can still drive
the quantity to zero. With this new notion of secrecy, came
the idea of secrecy capacity Cs which was originally defined
as the supremum of coding rates that can achieve weak
secrecy against a passive eavesdropper as a function of the
wiretap channel parameters, while maintaining arbitrarily low
probability of decoding error at the legitimate receiver. As long
as the legitimate parties are able to leverage an advantage
over the eavesdropper so that the effective main channel is
less noisy [7] than the eavesdropper’s channel, then Cs > 0,
which indicates that private communications are theoretically
possible.
Weak secrecy was shown to be insufficient in many
cases [10], and Maurer later defined a stronger metric known
as strong secrecy [11], where a scheme is said to achieve
strong secrecy if
lim
n→∞ I(M ;Z
n) = 0. (4)
It was recently noted in [12] that even strong secrecy may
not be sufficient for some applications because the assump-
tion is often made that message symbols are random and
uniformly distributed over the message alphabet. Of course,
in cryptographic scenarios, the messages are never perfectly
random and uniform, and it is known that in practice there
really is no universal compression algorithm that can provide
such messages at the input of secrecy encoders. Thus, we have
an even stronger notion of secrecy called mutual information
security which is achieved if
lim
n→∞maxpM
{I(M ;Zn)} = 0. (5)
Here we maximize I(M ;Zn) over all possible message distri-
butions pM . It is also shown in [12] that this notion of secrecy
is equivalent to distinguishing security and semantic security.
Although it took over 30 years after Wyner introduced
weak secrecy for an explicit code design to emerge that could
achieve it [13], it has already been shown that codes exist
that can achieve both strong and semantic secrecy, albeit over
simple wiretap channel models [4], [12], and surprisingly, the
secrecy capacity defined using strong or semantic security
is provably the same as that defined by the weak secrecy
metric [14], [4].
Although this list of information-theoretic measures is
impressive, there remain several wiretap channel models
that have proved elusive to explicit code designs where
information-theoretic security can be guaranteed. Thus, over
channels that are more representative of real world commu-
nications, such as the Gaussian wiretap channel or fading
channel scenarios, there have been additional security metrics
developed. For example, the authors in [5], [15] used bit-error
rate (BER) at the output of a decoder as a more practical means
of security measure. This metric can be simulated in a straight-
forward manner, just as is done for traditional error-correcting
codes. The authors in [5] developed a new secrecy metric by
identifying a target BER for the legitimate receiver, as well as
a target BER for an eavesdropper, and found the SNRs that
would achieve each of these targets. The security gap was
then defined as the difference between these two SNR values
in dB (or a ratio of the two linear values). The security gap
tells a designer what the required advantage is for obtaining
the desired security and reliability performance, and threshold
operating points for achieving both.
Authors in [16] studied coding mechanisms that provided
degrees of freedom in an eavesdropper’s decoder output, where
no information about certain bits could be obtained, forcing
iv
an attacker to guess the bits associated with the degrees
of freedom in the decoder. This notion was similar to an
information-theoretic security approach in the sense that the
information could not be attained through any degree of
processing, but was also very much unlike an information-
theoretic security approach because it restricted an attacker to
a specific attack strategy.
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT SECURITY METRICS
The metrics of the previous section give many tech-
niques for analyzing the security achieved by specific coding
schemes. Developing wiretap codes that are able to reach
the envisioned secrecy capacity for more practical chan-
nel models remains a formidable challenge, and perform-
ing the information-theoretic analysis is oftentimes deemed
intractable. The information-theoretic measures are still the
most desirable where possible to apply, but they also have
another weakness in the sense that they lead to codes that
are designed to meet a secrecy criterion in an asymptotic
blocklength regime only, thus limiting their applicability in
real systems that require short blocklength codes.
On the other hand, one should be careful when performing
security analysis that relies only on BER-based measures,
because high error rates do not necessarily indicate that some
information has not been leaked. In fact, modern cryptography
is based on computational security that does leak the informa-
tion about the message. These systems work not because of an
information-theoretic guarantee, but rather due to there being
no known computationally efficient algorithm that can find the
solution in any reasonable amount of time with any realistic
amount of computing power unless the key is known. Thus we
see that despite not achieving an information-theoretic security
measure, cryptosystems remain useful because they attain
security in a more practical/applied sense. In a similar way,
BER security analysis assumes the best known decoder/attack,
and makes calculations assuming an eavesdropper uses that
attack. While BER may provide some useful information about
the quality of the received data or the decoder output at the
eavesdropper, BER calculations are still made by averaging
large amounts of data, and are therefore only reliable as
blocklengths get large.
The metrics we introduce over the next two sections of this
paper take a BER approach, but rather than calculating simple
averages, make use of our knowledge of the CDF of bit error
rates over small blocks of data to provide lower bounds on
error rates through the receiver decoder chain. Making this
fundamental change in how BER is used to analyze security
in a system, allows us to make stronger guarantees about the
performance of secrecy codes in the short blocklength regime.
This is something that none of the metrics in Section II can
provide due to the way the analysis is completed either as
blocklength goes to infinity, or as simulations are averaged
over thousands of independent runs. Using the new metrics,
we also maintain the ease of simulation-based characterization
of security (which is particularly helpful when realistic channel
models are considered, where it is not known how to provide
an information-theoretic analysis). Table I outlines the utility
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Fig. 3. Bit error probability and probability of having fewer than or equal to
10 errors for an AWGN channel with BPSK modulation.
of each currently known physical-layer security metric, and
indicates the contribution of our new metrics lies in ease of
computation and providing the strongest guarantee yet for
analyzing finite blocklength code designs.
IV. THE BIT ERROR-CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION
FUNCTION
Let us consider an AWGN channel with BPSK modulation,
for which the BER (depicted in Fig. 3) is given by [17]
Pb =
1
2
erfc
(√
SNR
)
. (6)
A t-error correcting code of length 127 that is able to correct
up to 10 errors can recover from a BER of 10127 ≈ 0.079
assuming uniform error distribution, but errors over short
blocks of data are not guaranteed to occur so uniformly. Let
E be the number of bit errors in a block of n bits. For
a transmitted word of size n with independent bit errors,
the probability of having fewer than or equal to t errors,
Pr(E ≤ t) can be straightforwardly obtained from (6) as
Pr(E ≤ t) =
t∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
Pb
i(1− Pb)n−i. (7)
Let us now consider two operating points of Fig. 3: (a) SNR =
0 dB that leads to a BER close to the 0.079 that the code
supports, and (b) SNR = −3 dB, that leads to a BER ≈ 0.16.
Looking at Pr(E ≤ 10) in the same figure, for SNR = 0 dB
we have Pr(E ≤ 10) ≈ 0.58, meaning that the code would
still succeed more than half of the time. For SNR = −3 dB,
we get Pr(E ≤ 10) ≈ 0.006, which indicates that the decoder
will fail over 99% of the time, yet with a BER far from 0.5.
Also note that the curve for Pr(E ≤ 10) approaches zero for
low SNR values, with the BER still far from the idealized 0.5
value. With this in mind, the question arises of how close to
BER= 0.5 is close enough for security purposes?
To address this issue, we look to the distribution of errors
of transmitted data and propose the first of two new secrecy
metrics.
Definition 1 (Bit Error Cumulative Distribution Func-
tion). The bit error cumulative distribution function, BE-
CDFbc(t, SNR, Sm, Ci), gives us the probability of having
vTABLE I
SUMMARY OF CURRENT PHYSICAL-LAYER SECURITY METRICS, HIGHLIGHTING SOME OF THEIR PROS AND CONS. HERE WE SEE THAT ALTHOUGH OUR
NEW METRICS CANNOT PROVIDE INFORMATION-THEORETIC SECURITY, THEY ARE BEST IN CLASS AMONG THE ERROR-RATE SECRECY METRICS. NOTE:
W.P. MEANS with probability.
Directly applicable Easily computable Information-theoretic Strongest Achievable
Class Metric to short codes in general secrecy guarantees in class in practice
Impractical Perfect Secrecy Yes No Yes Yes No
Info-theoretic Weak Secrecy No No Yes No Yes
Info-theoretic Strong Secrecy No No Yes No Yes
Info-theoretic Semantic Secrecy No No Yes Yes Yes
Error rate BER No Yes No No Yes (BER ≈ 0.5)
Error rate Security gap No Yes No No Yes (security gap < 0 dB)
Error rate BE-CDFbc Yes Yes No No Yes (decoder failure w. p. ≈ 1)
Error rate BER-CDFac Yes Yes No Yes Yes (high error rates w. p. ≈ 1)
t or less errors, Pr(E ≤ t), as a function of the SNR for a
message of size Sm, encoded with a code Ci (refers to the
optional inner code).
From this metric we can deduce the probability of having
more than t errors in a block of data, giving us the power to
predict the likelihood of decoder failure when the code is a t-
error correcting code such as a BCH code. This information is
useful for identifying acceptable SNR operating points for both
friendly parties and eavesdroppers [18]. Notice from Fig. 1
that we measure this metric before the outer code (hence the
superscript bc) in a concatenated coding scheme, i.e. prior
to the secrecy code. Because of this, we choose to use SNR,
rather than Eb/N0 to show the results, although the conversion
can be made if desired.
A. Analysis
This metric can also be used to fine tune the security
and reliability levels of a coding scheme that relies on t-
error correcting codes. For example, if we assume no inner
code and set the outer code to a BCH(127, 64) code that
corrects up to 10 errors, and if we want a reliability level
of Pr(E ≤ 10) > 0.99, Bob would have to operate at an SNR
above 1.95 dB as indicated in Fig. 3. For a confidentiality level
of 0.99, i.e. Pr(E ≤ 10) < 0.01, Eve would need to operate
at SNR below −2.78 dB.
While relevant reliability and confidentiality levels with a
reasonable SNR gap between Bob and Eve may seem illusive
with simple coding schemes such as the mentioned BCH
code, this metric enables the selection of t-error correcting
codes that can be used in more evolved concatenated coding
schemes combined with the generation of interference [18] to
provide desired levels of reliability and confidentiality, as will
be described in Section VI.
V. THE BIT ERROR RATE-CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION
FUNCTION
The BE-CDFbc allows us to guarantee failed decoding with
high probability over certain SNR regions for t-error correct-
ing codes. However, a failed decoder does not necessarily
imply that the eavesdropper cannot obtain most of the message
bits at the output. Hence, in this section we introduce a metric
that can guarantee decoder failure with BER close to 0.5 in
the estimated message bits to strengthen the security guarantee.
For this section, let Pˆb be the measured proportion of bit errors
at the output of an error-correcting decoder measured over Sb
decoded message bits. For the case where the code being used
is a block (n, k) code, it makes sense to let Sb be an integer
multiple of k. The metric we propose in this section allows
a user to specify a required error rate at the output of the
eavesdropper’s error-control decoder over Sb bits using the
probability that Pˆb > 0.5− δ for any δ desired.
Definition 2 (Bit Error Rate-Cumulative Distribution Func-
tion). The Bit Error Rate-Cumulative Distribution Function,
BER-CDFac(δ, Eb/N0, Sb, C) is the quantity
Pr(Pˆb > 0.5− δ) (8)
calculated over Sb estimated message bits for a code C as a
function of Eb/N0, where C may be the concatenation of an
(optional) inner code Ci and an outer code Co.
We note that the ac exponent indicates that the metric is
measured after the code. Since the inner code is shown to be
optional in Fig. 1, this is referring to the outer (secrecy) code.
Also, because we are calculating this metric after the decoder,
it makes sense to use Eb/N0, rather than SNR. Finally, we
should note that this metric is actually the complement to the
CDF, but we choose to use a consistent nomenclature to that of
the BE-CDFbc. These two metrics packaged in a pair provide
valuable design information so as to achieve both reliability
and secrecy.
A. Analysis
The BER-CDFac allows us to guarantee decoder failure
with high probability in addition to high BER over short
blocks of Sb bits at the output of the decoder. Although the
metric is not information-theoretic, it comes much closer to
the information-theoretic definitions of secrecy than the BE-
CDFbc by limiting the amount of useful information to an
eavesdropper (as tends to happen with high BER). That is,
for a scheme that guarantees high BER using the BER-CDFac
metric, it is unlikely that the decoder will fail and yet provide
small BER at the output. Notice that this metric is also much
more robust than simply considering the average BER, and
examples are shown in the following section of the paper.
Similarly as with our BE-CDFbc metric, we now ensure that
vi
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Fig. 4. Depicts the BER-CDFac metric Pr(Pˆb > 0.5 − δ) for the
BCH(127, 92) code for Sb = 2×92 = 184 using L-order DPSK modulation.
Notice that for some δ values, the BER-CDFac approaches one, where other
curves appear to be bounded away from one.
the entire distribution of BER values for a specific length of
text Sb is within an acceptable security region.
Recall that Pˆb is the estimator of the error rate Pb at
the output of the final decoder over a short blocklength of
Sb bits. If we assume that each bit at the output of the
decoder is in error independently with probability Pb, then the
random variable Pn = SbPˆb models the number of errors in a
block of Sb bits, and is distributed according to the binomial
distribution with parameters µ = Pb, and σ2 = SbPb(1−Pb).
This means we can calculate the metric exactly as
Pr(Pˆb > 0.5− δ) = Pr[Pn > Sb(0.5− δ)]
= 1−
bSb(0.5−δ)c∑
x=0
(Sb
x
)
P xb (1− Pb)Sb−x.
(9)
Although the exact expression can be derived in this case, the
assumption of i.i.d. errors is not likely to hold in practice,
Pb may be unknown, and the calculation itself would be time
intensive, or require approximation using the Gaussian distri-
bution [8]. Thus, in practice, it makes more sense to calculate
the metric using straightforward Monte Carlo simulations.
By way of example, consider Pr(Pˆb > 0.5 − δ) as plotted
for a BCH(127, 92) code as the outer code with several varying
sets of parameters as portrayed in Fig. 4. Each case presented
uses Sb = 92 × 2 = 184 so as to allow a L = 4 order
modulation scheme without zero-padding. The modulation
scheme was chosen arbitrarily to be differential phase shift
keying (DPSK), and is either binary or quaternary as indicated
in the legend. Beyond this, we consider different δ values
as shown. Although there exist Eb/N0 values for which the
decoder fails with probability close to one, unless the resultant
BER is greater than (0.5−δ) with high probability, the metric
will not approach one in the limit as Eb/N0 → −∞.
Notice that the value the BER-CDFac approaches as
Eb/N0 → −∞ is strongly linked to δ, which makes perfect
sense. As δ grows, it is more possible to fit the entire distri-
bution of BER above the (0.5−δ) threshold. This observation
indicates that for any particular coding scenario, there may
in fact exist a minimum δ for which the BER-CDFac can be
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a function of δ and Sb.
made to go to one as Eb/N0 → −∞. Also notice in Fig. 4
that increasing the order of the digital modulation scheme can
bring about an effective shift towards better security. When
Pr(Pˆb > 0.5− δ) is bounded away from one, we are viewing
the random corrective capabilities of the code even when the
signal is completely overwhelmed by noise. Certainly, we can
do better by increasing Sb or the dimensions of the code as
well, but the utility of this metric is that we can get a clear
picture for what happens when Sb is small, thus providing
small blocklength security analysis in practical physical-layer
security system designs.
Let us consider the limiting value of the BER-CDFac as
Eb/N0 → −∞. Clearly this quantity is a function of δ and
Sb, and can be calculated by recognizing that Pˆb is a sample
mean of Bernoulli random variables Xi where
Xi =
{
1 if bit i is in error,
0 otherwise.
(10)
Let Pr(Xi = 1) = Pb as before. Then specifically,
Pˆb =
1
Sb
Sb∑
i=1
Xi, (11)
and by the central limit theorem Pˆb ∼ N (Pb, Pb(1−Pb)Sb ).
Clearly, this is true in the limit as Sb gets large, but even
for small and moderate blocklength sizes, the central limit
theorem still provides a good approximate distribution.
In the limit as Eb/N0 → −∞, we also have Pb → 0.5, and
Pˆb ∼ N (0.5, 0.25Sb ). Using the classic Gaussian standardization
technique [8], we find that
lim
Eb/N0→−∞
Pr(Pˆb > 0.5− δ) = Q
(
−2δ
√
Sb
)
. (12)
This limiting value of the BER-CDFac is shown in Fig. 5
over a range of δ and Sb values. These results can aid system
designers in choosing Sb (or k) in outer codes appropriately
so as to supply a desired BER-CDFac. Once Sb is chosen,
we also have a best possible value for the metric over which
any coding scheme can be compared. One characteristic of
good secrecy codes is that they will transition from zero to
the limiting value in this metric over a very short range of
Eb/N0.
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VI. APPLICATION
In this section, we show how the concatenated coding
system from [18] measures up using the two new metrics, and
discuss the utility of the system as a result of its BE-CDFbc
and its BER-CDFac curves. It should also be noted that [18]
goes through a design process based on the BE-CDFbc for this
coding scheme. Although we do briefly outline the scheme
and one possible design process here, the interested reader
is directed to the original work for further details. Finally,
we indicate how our new metrics may be combined with
this coding scheme to provide effective discrete memoryless
wiretap channel equivalents over which other secrecy coding
schemes may be implemented to achieve information-theoretic
security.
A. System Setup
The system analyzed in this section follows the general
concatenated coding framework outlined in Fig. 1. The outer
code can actually be considered as two encodings, where the
message is interleaved according to a secret key K (drawn
from the space of possible permutations on Sm input message
bits), and the key is encoded separately from the message
using a BCH(127, 64) code that is capable of correcting 10
errors. The interleaved message and the encoded key are then
appended together, and this constitutes the outer code. An
LDPC(1056, 880) code is then used as the inner code, which is
applied to the appended message and key to form a codeword
suitable for transmission over a noisy channel. Recall from
Fig. 1 that the general concatenated framework is such that
the outer code is intended to achieve the secrecy requirements
of the system, while the inner code is used to achieve reliability
for Bob.
In this system, however, there is more at play than just the
coding schemes. When the encoded data that are associated
with the key K are transmitted over the channel they are
intentionally jammed by some friendly network user with
jamming power equal to a fraction α of Alice’s transmit power.
The idea is to give Bob an advantage because of his location
or knowledge of the jamming signal so that the jamming
affects him only minimally, while an eavesdropper has no
information about the jamming signal and/or is positioned
in a geographic location that does not afford her the same
advantage as Bob [18], [19], [20]. Since the jamming is only
applied to the encoded bits associated with the interleaving
key, reliability in the system also stems from Bob being able to
recover the key for deinterleaving, while security in the system
depends on Eve being unable to recover the interleaving key.
Data are transmitted over a Gaussian wiretap channel using
BPSK modulation.
The receiving decoders at Bob and Eve apply a soft-
decoding algorithm for the LDPC code, and the BCH decoder
can then correct no more than 10 errors in the key bits. The
goal is to reliably keep the errors at the output of the LDPC
decoder at no more than 10 for Bob, and above 10 for Eve for
each transmitted key block, as the key bits must be used to
deinterleave the message bits at the final step of the decoder.
The mapping of keys to interleavers is such that any errors in
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Fig. 6. BE-CDFbc calculated when t = 10 for three different effective
jamming powers. These results anticipate the likelihood of decoder failure
for Eve at α = 0.7 for a BCH(127, 64) code at around 0.9952 when Eve’s
Gaussian channel has SNR = 4 dB. If Bob experiences an effective α = 0.2,
then he can operate with BE-CDFbc = 0.9975 at 6.5 dB.
the estimated key result in high error rates in the deinterleaved
message, even when the interleaved message bits are recovered
exactly [18].
B. Direct Results
Our two new metrics paint a complete picture of how this
system will respond for both Bob and Eve, thus providing
security analysis and system design constraints. The BE-
CDFbc will show us the operating point for Bob to attain any
desired level of reliability, and will also show us how Eve’s
decoding capability breaks down. The BER-CDFac will then
further enlighten us as to where we truly wish Eve to operate
so as to guarantee (with probability essentially one) high BER
at the output of her decoder. Coincidentally, this analysis also
allows us to identify the jamming power advantage required
during key transmission for the system to be successfully
deployed [18].
Let us assume that the effective jamming to Bob is αB =
0.2, while the effective jamming to Eve is αE = 0.7 (we also
include α = 1 in the figures for instructional purposes). The
BE-CDFbc results apply to the BCH-encoded key bits and are
given in Fig. 6, where we see that if Bob wishes to attain
an overall BER around 10−3, the system must be designed
to guarantee a BE-CDFbc value no lower than 0.9975. The
interpretation of this value is that less than 1/4 of 1% of the
transmitted key blocks should be decoded in error for Bob.
Also according to Fig. 6, Bob achieves this performance if
the SNR over his Gaussian channel is 6.5 dB or greater. We
also note that the BE-CDFbc for Eve at an SNR of 4 dB is
equal to 0.0048, meaning less than 1/2 of 1% of the time
Eve will receive a key block for which she can correct all the
errors if this BE-CDFbc value can be maintained.
To get the true feel for how Eve is affected by this scheme,
however, we need to track the distribution of error proportion
in Eve’s guess of the message bits as a function of Eb/N0
using the BER-CDFac as depicted in Fig. 7. Here we see that
for δ = 0.05, we can attain Pr(Pˆb > 0.5 − δ) = 0.995 at
roughly Eb/N0 = 4.7 dB, which corresponds to an SNR value
of approximately 4 dB. These results indicate that for this
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Fig. 7. BER-CDFac given for two delta values along with the BER. These
three curves are given for three different effective jamming powers, and show
that if Eve experiences jamming power αE = 0.7, then her BER over 753
message bits is guaranteed to be within δ = 0.05 of 0.5 with high probability
as long as her Eb/N0 is no greater than 4.7 dB. This corresponds to an SNR
value of approximately 4 dB.
scheme, insuring that Eve cannot correct all errors in the key
is in fact sufficient for insuring a high proportion of errors
in Eve’s estimate of each short blocklength of message bits
at the output of her decoder, which is exactly what we’d like
to see in a practical physical-layer security scheme. For the
sake of referring back to Fig. 5 for the limiting value of the
BER-CDFac metric, Sb for this scheme is the dimension of the
LDPC code (880 bits) minus the blocklength of the BCH code
(127 bits), because the BCH code only encodes the key bits
and the remainder of the bits in the dimension of the LDPC
code are dedicated to the message. This yields Sb = 753 bits.
C. Creating a Discrete Memoryless Channel
Explicit secrecy code constructions exist that can pro-
vide information-theoretic security; however, only for discrete
memoryless wiretap channels. As mentioned previously, cur-
rently known designs require either a noiseless main channel
for legitimate communication or a degraded wiretap channel
for the eavesdropper [1]. Thus, we have two possible research
directions for making these designs more practical to real
end users. First, effort can be placed to design secrecy codes
that operate over more realistic channels; and second, coding
and/or signaling techniques may be leveraged to produce an
effective wiretap channel [21] over which we already know
how to code for secrecy. In this section, we outline how our
new metrics and the coding scheme explained in Section VI-A
can be used to produce an effective discrete memoryless
wiretap channel.
Consider again the results shown in Fig. 7 that indicate
an eavesdropper experiencing jamming power αE = 0.7 and
Eb/N0 = 4.7 dB over a Gaussian channel can expect error
rates over 753-bit messages to have BER greater than 0.45
with probability very close to one. Since the analysis was
conducted over short block lengths, we offer not just an
average BER, but rather a low estimate of the BER over the
channel. We now consider applying one more code on the
outside of the entire scheme described in Section VI-A, as
depicted in Fig. 8, and modeling the remaining blocks as an
effective binary symmetric channel (BSC). The additional code
added is one that can leverage this effective channel to bring
about an information-theoretic security result (e.g., [22]).
In order to claim that the interior blocks in Fig. 8 can
truly be modeled as a BSC, we need to verify three main
properties of the BSC in our system: (1) each bit should be
erased independently from all other bits; (2) the probability
p of flipping each bit over the channel should be identical,
and we need to identify its value; and (3) we need to ensure
that soft information about the bit is either not available or
impossible to use at the secrecy decoder.
To ensure that bits within message blocks retain their
independence of being in error, as required by the BSC model,
we need to apply an inter-block interleaver as the first subcode
in the Outer Coder block in Fig. 8 to spread information
around as in [16], [21] and many other works. Although
there may exist some correlations between flipped bits over
the same transmitted packet, since all bits from every secrecy
codeword are transmitted in different packets over the channel
we effectively deliver independence between the bits at the
secrecy codeword level, which is where we need independence
for the secrecy code to work properly.
In terms of identifying the probability p that corresponds
to the flipping of each bit over the channel, we’ll use the
lower bound given by BER-CDFac as indicated above. By so
doing, we provide an even stronger guarantee than identifying
an average probability, since even short blocklengths maintain
this probability of bit error with probability close to one. Bit
error locations within secrecy codewords are kept uniformly
random as a byproduct of the inter-codeword interleaving at
the output of the secrecy encoder.
Finally, we need to address this issue of soft information at
the input of the secrecy decoder. Although soft information is
technically available here, we must deduce whether or not the
information is actually worth anything. In other words, what
do log-likelihood ratios (LLRs) look like when the overall
bit error rates at the output of an LDPC decoder are close
to 0.5? LLRs can be approximated by Gaussian distributions
with means centered at positive values if the bits should have
a value of zero, and at negative values if the bits should
have a value of one. The Gaussian approximation rule-of-
thumb stems from the central limit theorem for likelihood
ratios, where sums of random variables are calculated to
give the ratio’s next iteration [17], [23]. The distribution of
LLRs corresponding to bits in error is always symmetric and
centered at zero since the decision threshold at the end of
the soft iterative decoding algorithm is positioned directly
between the distributions of LLRs corresponding to differing
bit values. When the SNR is small enough that the code
doesn’t correct all the errors, distributions corresponding to
bits in error and correct bits start to look very similar. In fact,
when the noise completely overwhelms the coding scheme,
each of these distributions tends to an approximate Gaussian
distribution with mean zero and identical variances. It is this
property that supplies an effective decoding threshold for
iteratively decodable codes [17]. Finally, as the bit error rate
(BER) approaches 0.5, the statistical difference between the
distributions of LLRs for correct bits and bits in error becomes
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Fig. 9. Kullback-Leibler divergence between distributions of LLRs that
correspond to bits in error and LLRs that correspond to correct bits at the
output of an LDPC soft decoder, as a function of the hard-decision BER
at the output of the decoder. As the BER approaches 0.5, the distributions
become more alike, to the point where detecting a correct bit or a bit in error
is impossible, even with soft information.
negligible. To demonstrate this, we show through simulation
that the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence [24] between the
two distributions approaches zero as the BER approaches 0.5,
where the K-L divergence is given as
D(p||q) =
∫
x
p(x) log2
p(x)
q(x)
, (13)
and p(x) represents the distribution of LLRs for correct bits
while q(x) represents the distribution of LLRs for bits in
error at the output of a soft-information LDPC decoder. These
results are given in Fig. 9, where we observe D(p||q) going to
zero with increasing BER. Recognize that D(p||q) = 0 implies
that there is no statistical difference between p(x) and q(x), or
that the distance between the two distributions is zero. It can
be argued then, that as long as D(p||q) is small enough, soft
information at the output of an iterative decoder is unusable as
it doesn’t accurately depict any type of relationship between
a bit’s likelihood of being correct or in error.
The end result is that our new metrics mixed with the
scheme from [18] can provide the effective channel model
necessary for these information-theoretic designs to succeed.
We see in [1] that one type of secrecy code that may be
able to offer secrecy over this channel is that given in [22],
where known advantageous (good for Bob, and bad for Eve)
polarizations of bits in polar codes are used to transmit
secret information over a symmetric eavesdropper’s channel.
This coding scheme is known to achieve strong secrecy at
information rates approaching the secrecy capacity when the
legitimate channel can be modeled as noiseless. For our case
(where we’ve assumed that αE = 0.7, αB = 0.2, Bob’s
SNR ≥ 6.5 dB, and Eve’s SNR ≤ 4 dB), supplying a
probability of a flipped bit p = 0.45 over an effective BSC
to an eavesdropper while maintaining an effectively noiseless
main channel results in secrecy capacity Cs = Cm −Cw = p
bits per channel use, where Cm and Cw signify the channel
capacities of the main and wiretap channel, respectively [6],
[7], [24].
The approach outlined here, where we manufacture a
wiretap channel over which additional secrecy codes can be
utilized, can be extended to produce other effective discrete
memoryless wiretap channels as well that may form ideal
backdrops for other code designs to operate in more realistic
environments.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have discussed the landscape of physical-
layer security coding metrics. We note that most measures
in use today rely on information-theoretic analysis as block-
lengths tend to infinity, or use mean BER, both of which
give asymptotic results that have limited meaning for short
blocklength codes. We have proposed two new metrics that
effectively employ CDFs to provide a lower bound on the
security levels based on BER. Such an approach provides a
stronger guarantee of secrecy over realistic channel models
than simply using mean BER to estimate performance, and yet
our metrics retain their simplicity of calculation making them
xdirectly adaptable to real-world communication systems. We
have also shown how these new metrics may be used to reduce
realistic channel model environments to simpler models over
which known secrecy codes may be implemented to achieve
information-theoretic security.
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